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Internal political stability, policy reforms, and foreign aid have helpedRwanda stage a remarkable economic recovery over the decade sincethe genocide. Real GDP growth averaged more than 7 percent per
annum over the period 1998–2002, slowed to 3 percent in 2003, and is
estimated to be around 4 percent in 2004 and 6 percent over 2005–7.
Despite the growth in GDP, however, poverty remains widespread (Gov-
ernment of Rwanda 2002; World Bank 2003), and infrastructure bottle-
necks have emerged as a significant constraint to continuing economic
growth and human capital development. This is the case for the energy
sector, especially the provision of electricity, which is currently in a state
of crisis. The objective of this chapter is to document this crisis, explain
the need to increase electricity tariffs, and—most importantly—assess the
impact of such an increase on the poor and also analyze the distributive
properties of alternative tariff structures.
ELECTRICITY IN RWANDA: CURRENT CONTEXT
The modern energy sector in Rwanda is very small. Wood and charcoal
remain the most significant—and often the only—fuels available to
households and the productive sectors of the economy. Most of Rwanda’s
electricity has traditionally come from hydroelectric power produced
domestically, along with imports from Sinelac (which is a utility owned
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jointly by Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) and
SNEL (a utility company from the Democratic Republic of Congo). Elec-
trogaz, Rwanda’s main energy provider, provides service to fewer than
70,000 customers or about 7 percent of the households (nearly two-thirds
of them in Kigali alone). Peak electricity demand—which is currently not
being met—is about 50 to 55 megawatts. Grid extension beyond the
urban areas has been extremely limited. At about 20 to 25 kilowatts per
year, per capita consumption of electricity in Rwanda is among the lowest
in the world. Electrogaz is in a difficult situation because strong demand
growth is combined with unexpectedly low lake levels in both domestic
and shared hydropower sources. The financial situation of Electrogaz is
also problematic, and supply shortages and unreliability (there have been
extensive and lengthy power cuts beginning in early 2004) have raised the
cost of doing business for firms in Rwanda and weakened the prospects
of attracting new investments.
Rwanda is facing a severe electricity crisis because of increased
demand and production costs coupled with reduced revenues over time
in real terms per kilowatt-hour distributed. The government’s strategy has
been to respond to the twin objectives of extracting the sector from its 
crisis situation and establishing a sound basis for future growth and devel-
opment. Over the medium term, the government intends to establish
policies and institutional frameworks that would create incentives for
developing indigenous energy resources, ensuring the sustainable and effi-
cient performance of sector entities, and increasing access to electricity
and enhancing the flow of investments, both from development partners
and from the private sector. In the near term, the government intends to
use a transition strategy to address the power shortage by investing in ther-
mal generation and by reviving the performance of Electrogaz. Finally,
immediately, the government’s focus has been on raising electricity tariffs
to increase revenues for Electrogaz and avoid large deficits in the sector.
Objectives and Findings of this Analysis
A doubling of electricity tariffs was recently approved, from a flat rate of
42 Rwanda francs (RF) per kilowatt hour to a flat rate of RF 81.25 per
kilowatt hour. The new tariff became effective in January of 2005. How-
ever, the new flat rate may not be appropriate for protecting some of the
poorer residential customers of Electrogaz from the increase in the level
of electricity tariffs. This chapter provides simulations for the distribu-
tional properties of alternative tariff designs, including an interesting
Inverted-U Block Tariff Structure (IUBT) proposed by Electrogaz. In the
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next section of this chapter, which is based on material prepared for the
Urgent Electricity Rehabilitation credit recently granted to Rwanda (World
Bank 2004), we document the current state of crisis of the electricity sec-
tor and its origins, and explain the need for the upward revision of elec-
tricity tariffs. In the subsequent section, which closely follows a framework
for the analysis of utility tariffs proposed by Angel-Urdinola and Wodon
(2005), we assess the distributional characteristics of alternative poten-
tial tariff structures using recent household survey data.
It is important to note that this chapter was prepared as part of
broader work at the World Bank on Rwanda’s energy sector. This work
includes the Urgent Electricity Rehabilitation credit, which has a detailed
discussion of the difficulties encountered in the electricity sector (World
Bank 2004), and a second Poverty Reduction Strategy Grant or PRSG II
(World Bank 2005), which was approved by the Bank’s board in Novem-
ber 2005 and includes further measures related to this sector. Specifically,
one of the triggers for the PRSG III (that is, one of the measures that
should be implemented by the authorities to benefit from a third PRSG)
is the passage of electricity and gas legislation that includes tariff reform
in order to improve energy sector performance.
Our findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows. Because
few people have access to the electricity network, the share of the implicit
subsidies that prevailed before the increase in tariff and that benefited the
poor was very low. Today, consumption subsidies are still likely to be
badly targeted to the poor, and the IUBT proposal would improve tar-
geting performance slightly. Nevertheless, the IUBT tariff structure is less
pro-poor than a volume-differentiated tariff (VDT) would be. Further-
more, if substantial subsidies (or cross-subsidies) were to be implemented
in the future, it would probably be more effective from a poverty reduc-
tion point of view to give priority to subsidies for new connections to the
network for the poor rather than providing subsidies for consumption
for those households already connected. Yet there may still be some ben-
efit to also providing some level of protection for households that are
already connected and that consume small amounts of electricity, espe-
cially if such protection is not too expensive and if a careful analysis of
the distributional properties of the proposal is carried out.
Rwanda’s Electricity Sector: A Brief Review
In 2003 and in 2004, Rwanda’s demand for energy was about 50 to 
55 megawatts per year. However, domestic power generation facilities
consist of only four hydroelectric plants that together can produce about
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28.6 megawatts per year. The largest two of these plants (with a combined
capacity of about 24 megawatts) are based on interconnected lakes, the
levels of which have declined precipitously in recent years. As a result,
energy demand is not being met and the country is critically dependent
on imports of modern energy sources. Petroleum products are trans-
ported from Mombasa in Kenya via pipelines to Eldoret in Uganda, then
by road to Kigali and elsewhere in the country (which introduces very
high transportation costs and several duties and taxes).
In 2004, on average, about 20 percent of the peak demand and energy
requirements were not met. The lack of energy was more severe during
the dry period of August/September 2004, when as much as 50 percent
of the energy requirements during peak hours were not met. The extent
of hydroelectricity supply shortfall in the face of growing demand is
expected to continue for several years.
Apart from weaknesses in production, the national transmission and
distribution network is small and dilapidated. Some of the network was
damaged during the civil war period (in 1994), but all of it suffers from
inadequate maintenance, compounding the bulk supply problems. Tech-
nical and nontechnical physical losses—the difference between energy sent
out and energy billed—were about 25 percent in 2003. These losses are
attributable mainly to poor network conditions and metering equipment,
though there may also be a small amount of illegal use. Although invest-
ment requirements in network rehabilitation are high, only a small amount
of urgent patchwork repair and replacement has been done. Over the next
three years, it will be urgent not only that sufficient resources be made
available for expanding overall capacity to meet demand growth, but also
that Electrogaz revenues be adequate for financing the sharp increases in
variable (fuel and other operating) costs of using new capacity.
Electrogaz is Rwanda’s largest company. It is a 100 percent publicly
owned utility for grid electricity and urban water supplies. Although
national in scope, most of its distribution network and sales are concen-
trated in Kigali. Although the government abolished its legal monopoly
on power distribution in 2000, it remains the only operator in the sector.
A five-year management contract to Lahmeyer International has been in
place since November 1, 2003. The government of Rwanda has postponed
a decision on privatization of Electrogaz until the end of this management
contract. Transforming Electrogaz into a well-run, commercially oriented
utility is a major challenge. The success of the management contract with
Lahmeyer depends on the availability of funding for system rehabilitation
and expansion, and there have been delays in mobilizing the necessary
resources. In addition, considerable effort has had to be devoted to
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addressing the ongoing power shortages on a crisis basis, which has hin-
dered the longer-term task of system planning and improving Electrogaz’s
commercial performance.
Electrogaz is in a difficult financial situation. Revenue collection has
been poor until recently, but this has apparently improved since new
management took over in late 2003. More than half of all Electrogaz’s
customers—these are customers in both residential and commercial or
government sectors, most of them in Kigali—are on pre-paid meters,
contributing to advance payment on some 25 percent of the company’s
total sales. As with the supply infrastructure, there has been little new
investment on the customer service end: meters, billing, and accounting
systems are old and their reliability low. Still, the number of low-voltage
customers has grown about 60 percent since 1997, at an average of 4,000
new connections per year.
Electrogaz’s electricity and water tariffs were last revised in 1997.
Since then there has been nearly 50 percent real decline in electricity tar-
iffs in U.S. dollar terms—from about US$0.150 per kilowatt hour in 1997
to about US$0.072 per kilowatt hour in 2004. During this period, imports
from the jointly owned company Sinelac increased rapidly. Largely
because of its high lending terms and capitalization of debt service, Sinelac
tariffs have reached levels that cannot reasonably be passed through to the
customers. Electrogaz had a flat tariff of RF 42 per kilowatt hour (before
18 percent value added tax [VAT]) charged to all customers, irrespective
of type of activity, individual supply voltage or consumption volumes
from mid- to late 1997 to end-2004, when it was revised to a flat tariff of
RF 81.25 per kilowatt hour. The flat tariff structure limits the ability to tar-
get effective cross-subsidies to existing and prospective low-volume/poor
household customers.
Background and Objective of this Analysis
In recent negotiations between the World Bank and the Government of
Rwanda on a credit to the country for urgent electricity rehabilitation,
financial cost recovery objectives were agreed upon. The terms of the
agreement specify that during fiscal 2005 and 2006, cash revenues from
sales should be sufficient to cover cash operating expenses. Thereafter,
during fiscal 2007, cash revenues from sales should be sufficient to cover
cash operating expenses and debt service. Finally, effective in fiscal 2008,
Electrogaz should set tariffs such that cash revenues from sales should be
sufficient to cover cash operating expense, debt service, and 25 percent of
the investment program during that year.
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In setting these targets, it was assumed that Electrogaz would be
exempted from all taxes on generation fuels. Thus, the tariff adjustments
have been designed to enable Electrogaz to meet its financial objectives in
the respective years. In practice, as a temporary measure, a doubling of elec-
tricity tariffs was recently approved, as mentioned earlier. The rate rose
from a flat rate of RF 42 per kilowatt hour to RF 81.25 per kilowatt hour.
More recently, the Bank and the authorities of Rwanda agreed that a
trigger for the next Poverty Reduction Support Grant (PRSG III) would
be the adoption by the authorities of electricity and gas legislation that
would include tariff reform to improve energy sector performance. The
question now is which new tariff structure would be appropriate, and
whether the new proposals for an IUBT (discussed below) by Electrogaz
make sense. In the next section of this chapter, we try to answer these
questions by looking at the impact of the tariff structure on the poor
using recent household survey data, and we also simulate the distribu-
tional characteristics of alternative tariff structures.
Before presenting our framework for analysis and key results, it is
worth noting the limits of the exercise. Our objective was not to conduct
a full Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) as this analysis is tradi-
tionally understood. We did not have a request from the government to
do such a full analysis, nor did we have funding for a large scale study. We
aimed to provide a rapid appraisal of the main distributional features of
alternative tariff structures, since this was the main issue to be acted upon
by the authorities in order to complete the trigger for the PRSG III. We
focused on a rapid benefit incidence analysis and, by extension, on a
poverty impact analysis, without carrying out a social analysis of the
potential impact of the reforms. For example, we did not conduct any
stakeholder analysis, nor did we conduct qualitative work on the percep-
tions of key stakeholders, especially the poor, of the tariff reform. We
also did not carry out institutional work on the capacity constraints for
implementing specific policy proposals.
Most of the results provided here were presented at a workshop in
Kigali in March 2005. The workshop was organized jointly by the World
Bank and the Rwandese government unit in charge of the preparation,
implementation, and revision of Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy.
One of the sessions of the full-day seminar was devoted to electricity tar-
iffs, with representation from the management of Electrogaz. The work
that had been prepared by the Bank team for that session focused on
comparing the flat tariff structure existing in Rwanda at the time with tra-
ditional inverted block tariffs (IBTs) and volume-differentiated tariffs
(VDTs). As discussed in Komives et al. (2005), IBTs are typically based
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on the assumption that poorer consumers have lower levels of con-
sumption, so that reduced tariffs at low levels of consumption provide a
higher degree of affordability for the poor, while supposedly targeting
only the poor in so doing. Thus it is often believed that subsidies are not
provided to other classes of customers who consume higher levels of elec-
tricity and presumably have the means to pay the full cost for it. But the
problem with IBTs is that all customers benefit from the lower price for
the first bracket(s) of consumption, and this leads to high leakage of the
implicit or explicit subsidies to the non-poor.
VDTs, the alternative to the IBTs, provide the lower price at low lev-
els of consumption to only those households that consume less than a
given threshold. This threshold is often referred to as the lifeline level of
consumption that should be affordable to all. In many countries, IBTs
and/or VDTs have more than two levels of pricing for different blocks of
consumers. It can then be shown that VDTs tend to be better targeted
than IBTs, both of which have better distributional characteristics than
flat tariff rates such as the flat fee that had prevailed in Rwanda for many
years. This was also the case in Rwanda, and these were the results that
were presented by the Bank team. Unfortunately, as pointed out by the
seminar participants, VDTs have one weakness: they imply a discontinu-
ity in the amount of the bill for the customer. For example, assume that
the lifeline is set at 40 kilowatt hours per month per household, that a
lower price per kilowatt hour applies to households with consumption
levels below that lifeline, and a higher price applies to all households where
the consumption level is above the lifeline. This means that a household
consuming 40.5 kilowatt hours per month will have a much higher bill
than the household consuming only 39.5 kilowatt hours, although both
households may be equally poor. In addition, some households might
move from one price to another depending on their monthly consump-
tion and the billing system.
The idea of the IUBT came from the staff of Electrogaz. Their pro-
posal was to provide a reduced price on all consumption below 20 kilo-
watt hours, along with a price that is higher than the cost-recovery level
for all consumption between 20 and 100 kilowatt hours. The price for
units consumed above 100 kilowatt hours were to be set at cost-recovery
level. This was an interesting idea because it aimed to recoup some of the
subsidy provided in the lower bracket by requesting above-cost contri-
bution in the middle bracket. Under some circumstances, this type of tar-
iff structure can achieve a better targeting performance than a simple IBT,
while also avoiding the discontinuity in price under VDTs. After the sem-
inar, the Bank team estimated the extent of the difference engendered by
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the IUBT idea. These results are provided below, and then compared
among other tariff structures with the targeting performance of a VDT.
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES OF ALTERNATIVE 
TARIFF STRUCTURES
Our aim in this section is to provide a rapid appraisal of the distributional
characteristics of alternative tariff structures. For this we use data from a
household survey and a basic analytical framework proposed by Angel-
Urdinola and Wodon (2005).
Data and Basic Statistics
The analysis in this section is based on data from the Integrated Household
Living Conditions Survey (Enquête Intégrale sur les Conditions de Vie des
Ménages au Rwanda) conducted by the National Statistical Office between
October 1999 and July 2001. Data were collected between October 1999
and December 2000 in urban areas, and from July 2000 to July 2001 in rural
areas. The estimates of poverty presented in Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction
Strategy suggest that 62 percent of the population is poor (Government of
Rwanda 2002), with the poverty line set at 64,000 Rwanda francs per adult
equivalent per year (the use of the equivalence scale implies that not all
household members are considered to have the same needs). Only 10 per-
cent of the population is considered to be living in urban areas, which is
where access to the electricity network is concentrated.
Table 7.1 provides data on access to electricity in Rwanda’s popula-
tion (at the national level and in urban areas), as well as average con-
sumption and expenditure for electricity. At the national level, access to
electricity is virtually nonexistent in the bottom seven deciles of the dis-
tribution of consumption per equivalent adult essentially because access
is not available in rural areas, where close to 90 percent of the population
lives. This means that almost no one among the poorest 70 percent of the
population at the national level has access to electricity. The distribution
is different in urban areas, where access rates start to pick up in the third
decile. However, according to the official poverty estimates in the coun-
try, because only 14 percent of the urban population is considered poor,
access among the poor remains very low (as shown by the data for the
bottom two deciles of the distribution of consumption per equivalent
adult in urban areas). Note that the share of households paying for
electricity is close to the share of households declaring in the survey
that they use electricity. This suggests that the amount of fraud or illicit
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Table 7.1 Electricity Access, Consumption, and Expenditure in Rwanda, 1999/2001
Total expenditure Expenditure in Average kWh Share Access to 
Decile expenditure equivalent Household electricity per consumed per Access to paying for electricity 
per equivalent adult size per equivalent adult month per electricity electricity at the PSU Take up 
adult per montha equivalent adult per month a household (%) (%) level (%) rate (%)
National level
1 1,333.38 5.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.08 0.00
2 2,172.59 5.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.08 0.00
3 2,751.59 5.78 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 4.42 3.63
4 3,321.85 5.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.58 0.00
5 4,007.26 5.54 1.16 0.33 0.54 0.47 4.53 12.01
6 4,829.01 5.22 0.10 0.01 0.20 0.08 8.86 2.23
7 5,811.95 5.23 1.16 0.20 0.54 0.39 7.99 6.73
8 7,270.61 5.42 11.72 2.30 3.29 3.29 13.70 24.01
9 9,861.02 5.18 30.75 5.30 7.85 7.12 21.79 36.00
10 23,798.89 5.41 248.45 34.00 39.94 33.49 63.04 63.35
Urban areas only
1 3,431.03 6.44 10.81 3.10 5.07 4.36 71.16 7.12
2 5,486.05 5.97 12.02 2.00 7.01 4.53 82.78 8.47
3 7,714.26 6.81 59.45 13.00 22.16 21.92 88.51 25.04
4 9,778.16 6.46 188.28 33.00 42.25 37.78 89.24 47.34
5 12,349.32 6.25 139.25 22.00 44.20 36.77 94.19 46.92
6 15,094.02 6.08 130.24 21.00 40.41 29.00 92.31 43.78
7 18,788.44 5.87 266.60 46.00 56.70 49.83 93.98 60.33
8 23,440.77 5.49 334.94 48.00 54.77 45.28 94.53 57.94
9 30,665.18 6.22 427.62 68.00 70.29 64.99 98.73 71.19
10 57,860.51 5.06 1,030.07 115.00 92.90 79.32 99.34 93.51
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Rwanda’s EICV 1999/2001.
a. In local currency (Rwanda francs).
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connections in Rwanda is relatively low (higher levels of fraud have been
observed in other countries).1
Table 7.1 also shows that consumption levels are very low. In urban
areas, in the first six deciles of the population, the average consumption
is below 40 kilowatt hours per month, which is often considered as a pos-
sible lifeline level. Consumption is above 60 kilowatt hours per month
only in the top two deciles. Total expenditure for electricity is also very
low both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total expenditure
per equivalent adult of the households. This implies that an increase in
tariffs would have only a very minor impact on poverty among house-
holds connected to the network. Therefore, instead of looking at the
impact of tariff hikes on the poor (this impact would be negligible, espe-
cially at the national level, because most of the poor simply do not con-
sume any electricity), we will look at the distributional properties of the
implicit subsidies that existed until recently in Rwanda for electricity con-
sumption. These subsidies are implicit because, although no cash is dis-
tributed directly to the consumers of the electricity, the cost of its
production is higher than the price charged. We will then assess how dif-
ferent tariff structures would affect these distributional properties.
A Framework for Assessing the Targeting Performance 
of Consumption Subsidies
In order to analyze the distributional characteristics of electricity subsi-
dies, we use the very simple analytical framework proposed by Angel-
Urdinola and Wodon (2005; see also Komives et al., 2005, for an application
of this framework to a large set of countries).2 Our key parameter of
interest is Ω, which is the share of the subsidies, implicit in the tariff
structure, received by poor households and divided by the share of the
poor in the population. In mathematical terms, this is
where S denotes the nominal implicit subsidies, subscript P denotes the
population of poor people, and subscript H denotes the population as a
whole, P denotes the number of poor households or individuals, and H
represents the total number of households or individuals.
If Ω takes a value of 1, this implies that the subsidy is roughly neutral
from a distribution and poverty point of view, so that the share of 
benefits going to the poor is equal to their population share. A value
above (below) 1 implies that the program is somewhat pro-poor (not
Ω = ×S
S
H
P
P
H
, ( . )7 1
pro-poor), since the poor benefit from a larger (smaller) share of the total
benefits than their population share.
In practice, many poor households in the population do not receive
subsidies, and thus the value of Ω is usually less than 1. There are several
reasons for this. First, access to networks may not reach poorer areas. If
we denote access to networks by A, this means that in many cases AP < AH.
Also, poor households, although they may have access to the networks,
may be less likely than the population on average to use the services
because they cannot afford to. If we denote the share of all households that
have access to the service in their neighborhood and actually use the serv-
ice as UH A, this would mean that UH A < UP A in most cases. While UH A
represents the take-up rate of connections among those with potential
access, AH × UH A represents the actual household connection rate, with
the same relationships for the poor (denoted by the subscript P).
Now denote the share of eligible utility service users who are benefi-
ciaries of a subsidy by THU. In Rwanda, since the consumption of all
households was subsidized under the flat rate (before this rate was
increased), all users received the subsidy and therefore TH P = THU = 1.
The share of households receiving the subsidy was equal to the share of
all connected household times the share of households eligible for sub-
sidy (that is, AH × UH A × THU). Similarly, the share of poor households
receiving the subsidy is AP × UP A × TPU. We will use below the variable B
to capture this beneficiary incidence, so that:
A second important variable for assessing the targeting performance of
subsidies is the rate of subsidization or the difference between what house-
holds pay per kilowatt hour of electricity and what it actually costs to pro-
duce, transmit, and distribute that kilowatt hour. Denote the average unit
cost of producing, transmitting, and distributing the good by C. Then the
average rate of subsidization is R HT = 1 −EHT / (QHT ×C), with QHT being
the average quantity consumed by subsidy recipients and EHT being their
average expenditure on electricity. Again, these parameters can be esti-
mated for the poor as a group (by using the subscript P instead of H). The
average subsidy benefit per household receiving (and per poor household)
in the population as a whole (and among the poor) can then be written as
S
H
B R Q CH H H T H T= × × × ( . )7 4
B A U TP P P A P U= × × ( . )7 3
B A U TH H H A H U= × × ( . )7 2
Rwanda: Electricity Tariff Reform
245
The benefit targeting performance indicator Ω, which again represents
the share of the benefits of the subsidy obtained by the poor and divided
by the share of the poor in the population is equal to
Thus five ratios determine the value of the overall performance parame-
ter Ω: access, uptake, targeting, rate of subsidization, and quantity con-
sumed. The ratio of access rates (A) will in most cases be lower than 1
simply because the poor tend to live in areas without access to electricity.
The usage or take-up ratio (U) will also be less than 1 if the cost of con-
necting to the network is high for the poor, or if they live farther away
from the grid even when there is access in their neighborhood. This
means that the product of the R and Q ratios must be greater than 1 for
the subsidy to be progressive. As we will see, in Rwanda (and as has been
observed elsewhere), this is rarely the case.
Analyzing Empirical Results for Consumption Subsidies in Rwanda
We analyze the targeting performance of three different types of subsi-
dies or tariff structures: inverted block tariffs, volume-differentiated tar-
iffs, and U-shape tariffs. Table 7.2 provides estimates of Ω at the national
level and for urban areas using the official poverty line to define the poor.
The benchmark case is the situation that existed before the doubling of
tariffs at the end of 2004. At the national level for the benchmark case,
Ω takes a value of 0.007, which is extremely low, suggesting that less than
1 percent of the subsidy (or lack of cost recovery) that existed before the
increase in tariffs benefited the poor, even though the poor accounted for
62 percent of the population. When estimations are performed for urban
areas only, the value of Ω increases to 0.035 but this is still very low, in
part because of low official rates of poverty in urban areas (14 percent of
the urban population).
The low values of Ω are driven by the comparatively low electricity
connection rates among the poor compared with the connection rates of
the population as a whole. There are lower access rates (AP) in the neigh-
borhoods where the poor live than the overall access rate (AN), and lower
take-up rates where there is potential access among the poor UP than the
overall take-up rate (UN). Because all households that were connected to
Ω = × × × ×A
A
U
U
T
T
R
R
Q
Q
P
H
P A
H A
P U
H U
P T
H T
P T
H T
( . )7 6
S
P
B R Q CP P P T P T= × × × ( . )7 5
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Table 7.2 Distributional Characteristics of Alternative Tariff Structures
Benchmark 
flat tariff 
(price =
Inverted block tariff Volume-differentiated tariff
42 Rwanda L = L = L = L = L = L = Perfect 
Parameter francs/kWh) 20 kWh 40 kWh 50 kWh 20 kWh 40 kWh 50 kWh Targeting
National: Absolute poverty definition
AH 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
AP 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
UH A 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
UP A 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
TH U 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.06 0.30 0.45 0.01
TP U 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.72 0.72 1.00
RH T 0.48 0.11 0.20 0.23 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
RP T 0.48 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
QH T 88.26 88.26 88.26 88.26 13.15 25.43 32.74 38.46
QP T 38.46 38.46 38.46 38.46 10.11 11.83 11.83 38.46
A 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38
U 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
T 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 10.58 2.41 1.58 101.52
R 1.00 1.62 1.27 1.23 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Q 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.77 0.47 0.36 1.00
Ω 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.138 0.019 0.010 1.726
Urban areas: Absolute poverty definition
AH 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
AP 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
UH A 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
UP A 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
TH U 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.28 0.42 0.01
TP U 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.72 0.72 1.00
RH T 0.48 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
RP T 0.48 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
QH T 92.49 92.49 92.49 92.49 12.73 25.11 32.54 38.46
QP T 38.46 38.46 38.46 38.46 10.11 11.83 11.83 38.46
A 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
U 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
T 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 11.78 2.60 1.72 90.78
R 1.00 1.69 1.33 1.27 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Q 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.79 0.47 0.36 1.00
Ω 0.035 0.060 0.047 0.045 0.794 0.104 0.053 7.699
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Rwanda’s EICV 1999/2001.
Note: Simulation uses standard definition of the poor using the consumption aggregate and the official absolute
poverty line. Absolute poverty line = 65,145 Rwanda francs per equivalent adult per year. Unit cost is 81.25 Rwanda
francs per kilowatt hour. L = lifeline.
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the network benefited from the low tariff rate before the increase in tariff,
the targeting parameters TP and TN were both equal to 1. Finally, the low
value of Ω was also a result of higher consumption levels among the con-
nected population as a whole (who therefore benefited more from the
below-cost flat rate) than the consumption levels among the poor.
Table 7.2 also provides results from various simulations. We first
consider inverted block tariff structures with two brackets, so that con-
sumption below and above the lifeline—the threshold for the lower con-
sumption bracket, denoted by L in the table—have different costs per
kilowatt hour. Lifelines of 20, 40, and 50 kilowatt hours are considered.
In addition, we also simulate the value of Ω under volume-differentiated
tariffs for small customers. With this structure, only those who consume
less than the lifeline reap the benefit from the lower cost per kilowatt
hour. When simulations are conducted at the national level, none of the
scenarios generates a high value for Ω. In urban areas, Ω takes a signifi-
cantly higher value only for the volume-differentiated tariff and a lifeline
of 20 kilowatt hour. In this case, the value of Ω is 0.79, which is better,
but implies that the poor still benefit less than the population as a whole
from the implicit subsidy.
Additionally, table 7.2 provides simulations under which there is
perfect targeting of the subsidy or special tariff to the poor. In practice,
however, such perfect targeting cannot be achieved. These values should
simply be considered as the best that could be achieved under perfect
information and implementation given the current structure of connec-
tion rates. In fact, it is unclear whether a good proxy means-testing mech-
anism could and should be implemented in Rwanda’s urban areas at this
time, especially considering that poverty is much higher in rural areas.
In table 7.3, the simulations for the urban sample are reworked by
considering that 40 percent of the urban population is poor. This is an
arbitrary threshold, with poverty defined in relative terms and a much
higher poverty headcount than occurs under the official measures of
poverty. In a political economy setting, considering such alternative def-
initions of poverty in urban areas may be warranted by a desire to pro-
tect part of the connected population (which is located, for the most part,
in urban areas) from the increase in tariffs. With this alternative defini-
tion of the poor, the value of Ω is 0.30 in the benchmark case. The value
of Ω reaches 1.35 with the volume discount applied to the consumption
below 20 kilowatt hours. Note that, with perfect targeting, increasing the
population considered to be poor reduces the value of Ω.
Finally, we analyze results for the IUBT structure proposed by Elec-
trogaz. This tariff structure assumes, as before, a cost of RF 81.25 per
kilowatt hour. It also considers two thresholds: the lower price for fewer
than 20 kilowatt hours and the baseline price for more than 100 kilowatt
hours, with the middle consumption bracket priced at above-cost levels
in order to recoup the subsidies provided in the lower bracket. As pre-
sented in table 7.4, this alternative structure increases the value of Ω over
the value of the IBTs in table 7.3, but not by a lot (from 0.43 to 0.52,
assuming a lifeline of 20 kilowatt hours). Additional results are provided
in table 7.4 for alternative thresholds with the IUBT.
Apart from considering alternative tariff structures, there is
another way to provide benefits to the poor: by providing connection
subsidies instead of consumption subsidies. As seen above, consump-
tion subsidies are often difficult to target well because of the role played
by access and usage factors in attempting to channel subsidies to non-
poor households. With connection subsidies, access and usage factors
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Table 7.3 Distributional Characteristics of Alternative Tariff Structures 
in Urban Areas
Benchmark 
flat tariff 
(price =
Inverted block tariff Volume-differentiated tariff
42 Rwanda L = L = L = L = L = L = Perfect 
Parameter francs/kWh) 20 kWh 40 kWh 50 kWh 20 kWh 40 kWh 50 kWh Targeting
Urban areas: Relative poverty definition
AH 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
AP 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
UH A 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
UP A 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
TH U 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.28 0.42 0.18
TP U 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.15 0.45 0.57 1.00
RH T 0.48 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
RP T 0.48 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
QH T 92.49 92.49 92.49 92.49 12.73 25.11 32.54 63.01
QP T 63.01 63.01 63.01 63.01 13.55 21.99 27.45 63.01
A 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
U 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
T 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.87 1.62 1.38 5.65
R 1.00 1.42 1.31 1.27 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Q 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 1.06 0.88 0.84 1.00
Ω 0.30 0.43 0.39 0.38 1.35 0.63 0.51 2.50
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Rwanda’s EICV 1999/2001.
Note: Simulation uses a relative poverty line that identifies 40 percent of the urban population as poor.
Relative poverty line = 40 percent of households. Unit cost per kWh = RF 81.25/kWh. L = lifeline.
can play in the other direction. Since the poor tend to not have access,
they may benefit the most from connection subsidies. This is, however,
not necessarily the case, because it depends on who exactly will receive
the connection subsidy (this depends on how the extension of the net-
work takes place).
The methodological details for considering different scenarios are
explained in Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2005). We present here the
results from three scenarios:
 First, the households that receive connection subsidies are selected
randomly from those households in population without a connec-
tion today, which—from a measurement point of view—would be
the same as giving a connection subsidy to all the population not
connected today (scenario 1 in figure 7.1).
 Second, the beneficiaries of the connection subsidy are selected from
the population with access but without usage or take-up (scenario 2
in figure 7.1). This means that to benefit from access, households
must not currently use the service but must live in an area where the
service exists.
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Table 7.4 Distributional Characteristics of the Proposed IUBT
Proposed
block tariff
Parameter structure Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TP U 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
RH T 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.16
RP T 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.17 0.21
QH T 92.49 92.49 92.49 92.49 92.49
QP T 63.01 63.01 63.01 63.01 63.01
T 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
R 1.72 2.22 1.46 1.35 1.30
Q 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
Ω 0.52 0.67 0.44 0.41 0.39
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Rwanda’s EICV 1999/2001.
Note: Simulation uses the urban areas sample and the relative poverty measure. A and U parameters are equal to
those in table 7.3. Relative poverty line = 40 percent of households. Unit cost per kWh = 81.25 RF/kWh.
Proposed block tariff structure: 0–20 kWh : P1 = 42; 20–100 kWh: P2 = 88; >100 kWh : P3 = 81. Simulation
1: 0–15 kWh : P1 = 42; 15–100 kWh: P2 = 88; >100 kWh : P3 = 81. Simulation 2: 0–30 kWh : P1 = 42; 30–100 kWh:
P2 = 88; >100 kWh : P3 = 81. Simulation 3: 0–40 kWh : P1 = 42; 40–100 kWh: P2 = 88; >100 kWh : P3 = 81. Simula-
tion 4: 0–50 kWh : P1 = 42; 50–100 kWh: P2 = 88; 100 kWh : P3 = 81.
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Scenario 3: Distribution of
connection subsidies mirrors
distribution of existing
connections
Scenario 2: Only households
with access but no connection
receive subsidy
Scenario 1: All unconnected
households receive subsidy
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Source: Authors, using Rwanda’s EICV 1999/2001.
FIGURE 7.1 Connection versus Consumption Subsidies in Rwanda
 Third, the beneficiaries of the connection subsidy have the same dis-
tributional characteristics as the households connected today because,
for example, of a complete lack of targeting in the connection subsidy
design and a low access rate. This lack or targeting and low access
would essentially prevent the poor from participating in the benefits
of the increase in connection rates that are made feasible by the con-
nection subsidy.
The key results for the value of Ω in all three scenarios are presented in
figure 7.1. They are compared with the values of Ω for consumption sub-
sidies in the case where the lifeline is set at 40 kilowatt hours (the latest
proposal of Electrogaz was to set the lifeline at 20 kilowatt hours, but the
results are similar for alternative lifelines and can be found in tables 7.3
and 7.4). In all scenarios presented in figure 7.1, we have used the urban
sample and the relative poverty line for the estimations.
Clearly, connection subsidies have the potential to be better targeted
than consumption subsidies. This conclusion is similar to the one drawn
by Estache, Foster, and Wodon (2002) in their review of the evidence for
Latin America. But this may not be necessarily the case, however—it
could depend on how the mechanism for providing eligibility for con-
nection subsidies would be implemented in practice.
Indeed, although connection subsidies have promise, they need to be
implemented well to ensure good targeting and limit costs. For example,
in their study on social or subsidized water connections in Abidjan and
Dakar, Lauria and Hopkins (2004) explain how social connections were
financed through a water development fund paid for with a surcharge on
water tariffs. Unfortunately, poor targeting resulted in 90 percent of resi-
dential connections in Abidjan being eligible for the subsidy. In fact, some
of the connected households paying the surcharge were found to be
poorer than many of the households receiving the new social connections.
The program suffered from distorted incentives because the flat fees paid
for each social connection to private operators were an incentive for those
operators to maximize the number of subsidized connections while at the
same time seeking for these social connections richer households that
were likely to consume more water and were located closer to the pipes.
In this way the utilities would reap higher revenues and minimize the cost
of connecting in the first place. According to the authors, these distortions
may in fact have led to reductions in connection rates or at least to an
increase in the time needed to get connected among the poorest house-
holds located in informal settlements. The fact that the social connections
required households to own the land on which their dwelling was located
also probably undermined the targeting performance of the program.
This example makes it clear that for connection subsidies as well as for
consumption subsidies, a good design of the eligibility mechanism is
required for the subsidy to actually reach the poor.
CONCLUSION
The electricity sector in Rwanda is currently in a state of crisis. The coun-
try is simultaneously experiencing a growing demand for electricity, ris-
ing costs resulting from the need to rely increasingly on thermal power
generation in the near term, and, until recently, very low tariffs that had
remained unchanged for seven years and did not permit the national
operator Electrogaz to break even. The government has recently approved
a near doubling of tariff rates; its present consideration of alternative tariff
designs is part of an effort to protect the poor from this increase in tariffs.
The objective of this chapter has been to document the extent to
which the poor did benefit from past subsidies (in the form of tariffs that
were well below cost recovery rates), and to discover whether they would
benefit from alternative implicit or explicit cross-subsidies. Because access
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rates to the network are very low among the poor, the share of the implicit
subsidies that prevailed before the increase in tariff and that benefited the
poor was also very low. In other words, previous subsidies were badly tar-
geted. Today, because tariffs have been increased to cost-recovery level,
there are no more implicit subsidies in Rwanda’s tariff structure.
Still, the government is considering amending the tariff structure to
protect poorer consumers, and Electrogaz has proposed an interesting
IUBT structure to achieve this objective without compromising the objec-
tive of cost recovery. We have shown that, in Rwanda, the subsidies or
cross-subsidies under the IUBT would be better targeted to the poor than
those existing under the previous flat tariff structure. The IUBT per-
formed only slightly better than a more traditional IBT, but less well than
a VDT. It remains to be seen—by looking at other case studies for other
countries—if, under other circumstances, the IUBT idea could be proven
to have a stronger positive impact on the overall targeting performance
of subsidies. Although the IUBT in Rwanda would have the advantage
over the VDT of avoiding the discontinuities that exist in VDT systems
between customers just below and just above the lifeline level, the target-
ing performance of the VDT was superior. Therefore the VDT is the
structure that could probably be recommended for poverty reduction in
Rwanda.
Another important result of our analysis was the finding that it would
probably be better for poverty reduction to give priority to a subsidy
mechanism for new connections to the network rather than a subsidy for
consumption for those households that are already connected. Such a
new-connection subsidy would enable more households to benefit from
electricity (this has been proven to generate positive externalities for out-
comes related to education and health, for example). It would target a
population currently without access, which tends to be poorer than the
population with access. In fact, recent trends in new connections show a
strong demand from households and small commercial as well as institu-
tional customers. Although in the near term Electrogaz bulk supplies and
network and metering capacities are extremely constrained, once the Elec-
trogaz capacities have been rehabilitated, there is a considerable potential
for expanding the electricity market in the immediate proximity of its cur-
rent distribution network.
Even if subsidies for higher rates of connection appear to be better
targeted for poverty reduction (and perhaps for achieving other devel-
opment objectives related to the Millenium Development Goals) than
subsidies for consumption among users currently connected, it must be
recognized that there would be benefits in providing at least some level
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of protection from higher tariffs for those households consuming small
amounts of electricity. This level of protection would be important also
for new and potentially poorer households that are newly connected to
the network. If such consumption cross-subsidies were to be imple-
mented, they could take place either in the form of VDTs or IUBTs as well
as IBTs. A detailed evaluation of the different pricing alternatives would
need to be considered, following the preliminary assessment provided
here. It is relatively straightforward to use our framework to conduct
such assessments with household surveys.
NOTES
1. Casual observations and discussions suggest that there is a considerable degree
of “subsidiary connections,” however, so that some agents (external to Elec-
trogaz) extend lines to other households. These external agents extract higher
unit prices for electricity than the prices they pay to Electrogaz.
2. For simplicity of exposition, we will assume throughout the rest of this chapter
that households have a zero elasticity of demand to changes in prices. Given the
very low levels of consumption recorded in the survey, and given the fact that
households are unlikely to adjust their consumption downward significantly
with an increase in prices, the elasticity is indeed likely to be low, so that the
assumption is not likely to result in severe bias in the empirical results.
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